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CoNsnrunoNAL LAw-C1VIL RIGHTS STATUTE-FAILURE TO RELEASE 
PrusoNBR PROMPTLY NOT A VIOLATION OF SECTION 242--A Florida state at-
torney was charged with violation of the Federal Civil Rights Statute1 for failure 
to apply for release of a Negro prisoner held nineteen months without charge. 
The prisoner had been held on request of the state attorney for further prosecu-
tion or use as a witness after a verdict had been directed in the prisoner's favor 
in a prior murder trial. Neither the prisoner nor defense counsel petitioned for 
release. The United States District Court dismissed the indictment. On ap-
peal, held, affirmed. No duty existed on the part of the Florida state attorney 
to make application for release of the prisoner; thus the failure to procure· re-
lease did not subject defendant to prosecution under the civil rights statute. 
United States v. Hunter, (5th Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 356, cert. den. 348 U.S. 
888, 75 S. Ct. 208 (1954). 
Section 242 is one of the two federal civil rights statutes, imposing criminal 
sanctions, which have survived post-Civil War legislation.2 It was declared con-
stitutional in the landmark case of Screws v. United States.3 The majority in 
that case, inter alia, declared the act not void for vagueness by interpreting the 
words "willfully to deprive," to mean an intentional deprivation of a specific 
federal right made definite by prior decision or rule of law. 4 Failure to instruct 
the jury properly on this explicit meaning of "willfully to deprive" will invalidate 
a conviction.5 This interpretation has been followed in cases primarily involving 
affirmative acts of police brutality.6 In the principal case, however, the question 
is whether the statute may be extended to cover acts of official omission while 
nevertheless remaining within the narrow confines of the Screws case interpreta-
tion. That a deprivation of equal protection can result from state omissions has 
been long recognized.7 Failure of police officials to protect prisoners8 or to 
protect religious minority members from mob action9 has resulted in convictions 
1 62 Stat. L. 696 (1948), 18 U.S.C. (1952) §242: "Whoever, under color of any law, 
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, 
Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or 
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, 
pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, 
or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be £ned not more than 
$1,000 or imprison~ not more than one year, or both." 
2The other is 62 Stat. L. 696 (1948), 18 U.S.C. (1952) §241. 
3 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945). Defendant Screws, a Georgia sheriff, with 
other officers, beat a handcuffed Negro prisoner to death after his arrest on a 5Purious 
charge. Section 242 was then 35 Stat. L. 1092, §20 (1909), 18 U.S.C. (1940) §52. 
4 Screws v. United States, note 3 supra, at 104. 
5 Pullen v. United States, (5th Cir. 1947) 164 F. (2d) 756. 
6Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 71 S.Ct. 576 (1951); Crews v. United 
States, (5th Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 746. 
1 See McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 35 S.Ct. 69 (1914); 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232 (1938). 
s Lynch v. United States, (5th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 476 (two Negroes were 
turned over to a Ku Klux Klan mob). 
9 Catlette v. United States, (4th Cir. 1943) 132 F. (2d) 902 (Jehovah's Witnesses 
were subjected to mob indignities while defendant deputy sheriff looked on). 
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under this law.10 These cases were distinguished in the principal case primarily 
on the ground that the state attorney was under no duty to act. This defect is 
said to void the indictment under the Screws case doctrine since the jury, having 
no definite guide to determine defendant's duty, would subject him to punishment 
without prior warning.11 This is a shift in approach. The guide of certainty 
for state officials in the Screws case related to rights held inviolate.12 Official 
duty is made the standard here. A federal civil right, formerly made definite, 
i.e., not to be imprisoned without a fair hearing, was denied the victim in this 
case.13 Following the Screws doctrine, the crucial question is whether a state 
official "willfully" deprived the prisoner of this right. In determining whether 
the required intent to violate the act is present, a jury14 can consider all the 
facts and circumstances of the alleged deprivation.15 There is no explicit 
Florida law requiring a state attorney to petition for a prisoner's release after he 
has committed him. However, in view of the circumstances of this case,16 and 
in view of provisions of the Florida constitution,11 statutes,18 and case holdings,19 
a jury would not be without legal guide in determining whether a duty existed, 
the omission of which caused a willful deprivation of a federally protected right. 
In a case such as this, the determination of duty will be the essential element 
in proving the requisite willful intent. While criminal statutes must be nar-
rowly construed to protect the accused, the reasoning in this case could well 
eliminate protection of the innocent in areas most needed, i.e., where officials 
are under no express state duty to act.20 
Stephen C. Bransdorfer 
10 See "Civil Rights During War: The Role of the Federal Government," 29 IowA 
L. R:sv. 409 at 410 (1944). The then Chief, Civil Rights Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
stated that these cases stand as precedent for use of this law to convict state officers for 
wilI£ul omissions as well as affirmative acts. But see RBePY, CxviL RroHTS IN nm UNITl!D 
S'I'AT.l!s 30 (1951) for the opposite view. 
11 Principal case at 359. 
12 "It is said, however, that this construction of the Act will not save it from the 
infirmity of vagueness since neither a law enforcement official nor a trial judge can know 
with sufficient definiteness the range of rights that are constitutional. But that criticism is 
wide of the mark." Screws v. United States, note 3 supra, at 104. The dissenters were 
also concerned with the vagueness of "rights" protected. Id. at 150. 
13 Culp v. United States, (8th Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 93 (victims imprisoned for 
purpose of extortion). 
14'fhis is a jw:y question. Screws v. United States, note 3 supra, at 107. See also 
Pullen v. United States, note 5 supra. 
lli Crews v. United States, note 6 supra. 
16 The detention without charge continued for nineteen months. Racial tensions 
existed locally. The state attorney and defense counsel discussed the detention several times 
leaving it to the sole discretion of the state attorney as to whether the detention would 
continue. 
11Fu. CoNsT., Declaration of Rights, §§3, 8, 11. 
1s Fla. Stat. (1953) §§915.01, 27.02. 
19 The prosecuting attorney occupies a semi-judicial position. Washington v. State, 
86 Fla. 533 at 542, 98 S. 605 (1923). See also Deeb v. State, 131 Fla. 362, 179 S. 894 
(1937). 
20 See REPORT oP nm PREsmENT's CoMMITrBB ON Civ!L RroHTS: To SBcURB 
THESE RrGHTS (1947). 
